|
3rd Division
On 23 April, the 3rd Division under
command of Major-General Savige assumed control in the Wau-Bulolo area
and Kanga Force ceased to exist. Savige's force originally included
only the 17th Brigade and three Independent Companies (2/3rd, 2/5th
and 2/7th). Savige was instructed to turn the area into an active
operational zone for mobile defence. It was estimated that there were
5,500 Japanese around Lae and Salamaua with between 6,000 and 8,000 at
Madang and from 9,000 to 11,000 at Wewak. Savige, who was ordered not
to attack Salamaua directly, decided to establish firm bases as far
forward as possible and to harass the enemy with patrols. However,
only small forces could be maintained in the forward area and no
useful military purpose was served by attacks and raids which were not
properly organised, supported by superior fire and fully driven home.
The Japanese were dug in on the
Pimple, Green Hill and Observation Hill along the main track from Wau
to Mubo. On 24 April a company of the 2/7th attacked the Pimple and
Green Hill, Four aircraft strafed the Japanese position and then the
company advanced in two columns supported by mortar fire, but the
enemy were firmly entrenched on the precipitous feature and the
Australians were halted. Next day another attack, supported by
aircraft and the 1st Mountain Battery, limited to fifty rounds a gun,
also failed. On 7 May a company attack was again launched against the
Pimple but again it failed. On 9 May the Japanese themselves attacked
in the Pimple area and surrounded the forward Australian company,
which was not relieved until the afternoon of the 11th, by which time
it had withstood eight attacks by parts of two Japanese battalions.
The 2/3rd Independent Company had
been probing deeply and seeing that the Japanese were only lightly
holding Bobdubi Ridge obtained permission to attack it. On 3 and 4 May
the Japanese were pushed off part of Bobdubi Ridge and in the
following days drove back Japanese moving up to retake it. From
Bobdubi, the 2/3rd Independent Company was able to severely harass the
Japanese with raids and ambushes. So successful were the 2/3rd
Independent Company's tactics that Savige felt constrained to warn
them not to attempt too much; `premature commitments in the Salamaua
area could not be backed at present by an adequate force', he
signalled.
The pressure was kept up round
Bobdubi and on 11 May a patrol found the ridge to be abandoned,
quickly occupied it, and exchanged fire with the enemy on Komiatum
Ridge on which the main track travelled. The Japanese reacted strongly
to this threat to their communications, launching a full-scale attack
supported by guns and mortars on the 14th and forced the Australians
to withdraw. On 15 May, over 100 Japanese aircraft attacked the
Australian positions in three heavy raids. The Japanese maintained
their air attacks in the following days, but generally against targets
farther to the Australian rear. On 17 and 18 May large formations of
Japanese aircraft raided Wau airfield.
In late May, the 2/6th Battalion
relieved the 2/7th Battalion and the 15th Brigade headquarters and
another battalion of that brigade began to arrive in Savige's area.
During May Australian Beaufighters and Bostons with American Mitchells
attacked Madang and Lae, maintaining steady pressure on these bases.
The RAAF now had three squadrons tied more or less to the Salamaua
operations with four squadrons based on Milne Bay and engaged chiefly
in attacks on shipping and in reconnaissance. Two Catalina flying boat
squadrons based on Cairns also played a part in the operations in New
Guinea by dropping mines in the enemy's harbours, making night raids
and supporting coast-watchers in enemy-held territory.
Instructions were issued for an
advanced base on the coast to be seized within sixty miles of Lae,
this being the farthest distance landing craft could carry troops in
one night. Nassau Bay was chosen and its occupation would enable the
force round Mubo to be at least partly supplied by sea. In addition to
the bay, the high ground around Goodview Junction and Mount Tambu and
the ridge running thence to the sea were to be seized.
The focus of the operations towards
Salamaua were to draw the Japanese away from Lae and Salamaua was not
to be assaulted until after the Lae operation. Until the Lae offensive
commenced, the Japanese were to be led to believe that Salamaua was
the main objective.
On 19 and 20 June there were signs
that the enemy was about to anticipate the allied attack. They were
patrolling aggressively; during the 20th enemy aircraft made more than
eighty bombing sorties against the Australian positions. The right
forward company of the 2/6th, holding its wide area towards Nassau
Bay, was under sharp fire on the afternoon of the 20th. Next morning
an attack in strength was dispersed; in the afternoon a stronger
attack was made and soon the Australians were closely engaged. A fresh
company reinforced the one under attack.
At nightfall the Japanese withdrew
having lost an estimated 100 men, but they renewed the attack on the
22nd and 23rd, when the beleaguered troops were heartened by the sight
of Beaufighters strafing along the track. That afternoon the Japanese
attacks ceased. The 150 Australians on Lababia Ridge lost eleven were
killed and twelve wounded. The had been attacked by two Japanese
battalions, 1,500 troops, who lost forty-one killed and 131 wounded.
Nassau Bay
The 162nd US Regiment landed at
Nassau Bay on the night of the 29/30 June and next morning moved out
of the bridgehead. On 1 July the easternmost company of the 2/6th
Battalion advanced to the coast along the south arm of the Bitoi
driving off a company of Japanese. On the morning of the third day
ashore, 2 July, the main American force remained clustered round the
beach, but that afternoon one company advanced to the Bitoi. Next day
four 75-mm guns were landed at Nassau, a most important reinforcement,
and by the 4th more than 1,400 troops were ashore. Papuan soldiers
advancing along the coast ahead of the 162nd US Regiment reached Lake
Salus on 9 July and then pushed on to Tambu Bay.
On the morning of 7 July the 2/6th
had attacked Observation Hill and by nightfall held most of it. Next
day the leading Australian company advanced a stage farther towards a
creek where it was to link with the Americans from the Bitoi. On the
9th, now supported by the American field guns whereas formerly there
had been only two mountain guns behind them, five Australian companies
pressed on with aggressive patrols until, on the 10th, only
seventy-five Japanese survived in the area, and their line of retreat
was cut.
On the 12 May the Pimple was
occupied. On 13 May there was a general advance and on 14 May Mubo
airfield and Green Hill were taken. The Japanese still stoutly
defended Old Vickers where they were strongly dug in to defend the
track to Salamaua and on 7 and 9 July stopped attacks by the 58th/59th
Battalion.
The US III/162nd Battalion (Major
Archibald B Roosevelt) was assembled at Nassau Bay by 12 July as a
preliminary move to establish artillery at Tambu Bay. On the 21st the
American battalion reached Tambu Bay and supplies were being unloaded
there. The Americans' task was to capture Scout Ridge, overlooking the
bay. Attacks on the 22nd failed and a second battalion (the US
II/162nd) was sent into reinforce the attack.
On 16 July a company of the 2/5th
Battalion had assaulted Mount Tambu with great dash and captured all
but the main northern knoll. The Japanese counter-attacked again and
again that night, supported by mortar bombs and shells from a mountain
gun. A second company reached the area next morning. On the night of
the 18 May the Japanese attacked and almost encircled the two
Australian companies on Tambu, and next day a fierce struggle
developed. By 2.30 pm, after much slaughter of the Japanese, they
accepted defeat and left the Australians in possession of the southern
slopes.
Farther north, on 15 July, after
mortar and Vickers-gun fire, two platoons of the 2/3rd Independent
Company attacked Ambush Knoll south of Namling, while the 58th/59th
Battalion attacked towards Bobdubi in another effort to cut the
Japanese communications. One platoon of the Independent Company drove
the Japanese from their forward positions, the other thrust them from
Orodubi, and that night the Japanese abandoned Ambush Knoll. The
attack by the 58th/59th was upset, however, by Japanese counter-moves.
In a renewed attack on the 17th the Independent Company again carried
out its task but the 58th/59th was held up.
The establishment of the Nassau Bay
base had made it possible to bring in and supply a substantial
quantity of artillery. By 23 May two US field artillery battalions,
two Australian field batteries, the 1st Australian Mountain Battery,
the 2/6th Australian Survey Battery, and four anti-aircraft batteries
were in place. On the right flank the American regiment was still
making little progress. In the fourth week of July the US II/162nd
battalion completed its arrival at Tambu Bay and was given the task of
capturing 'Roosevelt Ridge' as it was now named. The battalion
attacked and gained and held a foothold on the ridge. The Japanese
were well dug in and not to be driven out by frontal attacks.
Roosevelt's battalion, aided by Papuan patrols, was now employed
cutting the enemy's supply route to the west.
On 28 July a flanking attack by a
company of the 2/6th took a feature forward of Ambush Knoll. The same
day 58th/59th Battalion supported by artillery, mortar and machine-gun
fire at last took the stubborn Old Vickers position and drove the
Japanese from Bobdubi Ridge. It was estimated that in the six weeks to
6 August, the 15th Brigade had killed 400 Japanese for a loss of
forty-six killed and 152 wounded, an indication of the increasing
tactical superiority of the attackers.
The leading battalion of the 29th
Australian Brigade, the 42nd, was moved forward into the Nassau Bay
area and thence marched northward and at length went into position
between the Americans on the right and the 17th Brigade, of which it
became part. As a preliminary to the capture of Mount Tambu the 42nd
Battalion occupied Davidson Ridge between Tambu and Roosevelt Ridge.
Then on 13/14 August the II/162nd Battalion took Roosevelt Ridge after
a heavy artillery barrage which bared it of vegetation.
The 15th Brigade's attack opened on
14 August. Twenty-nine heavy bombers accurately bombed Coconut Ridge
with devastating effect, and guns, mortars and machine-guns brought
down a barrage. A company of the 2/7th Battalion then attacked up a
cliff so steep that the men had to crawl on hands and knees, but by
early in the afternoon they had gained the North Coconuts position. On
the night of the 16/17 August the Japanese abandoned South Coconuts.
The 2/6th Battalion opened its
attack on Komiatum Ridge on 16 August. After about 500 shells had been
fired into the Japanese positions two companies attacked and in
twenty-five minutes had occupied the objective. The enemy in the Mount
Tambu area were now surrounded, their routes to the north being cut on
Komiatum and Davidson Ridges. It was expected that lack of rations
(patrols had discovered they were delivered every three days) would
cause the Japanese to attempt the break out on the third night. On 19
August patrols of the 2/5th found Goodview Junction deserted and US
I/162nd Battalion occupied Tambu without opposition.
The 15th Brigade now pressed in
towards the track leading to Salamaua. On 17 August after a
bombardment two platoons of the 2/3rd Independent Company advanced;
one occupied the junction of the Bobdubi-Salamaua track and another
track from the south without opposition, but the other was held. Heavy
fighting developed, the Japanese launching strong counter-attacks. On
19 August Savige ordered that every effort must be made to close the
enemy's avenues of escape between Komiatum and Bobdubi Ridges. Next
day the brigade attacked on a wide front, and the 58th/59th succeeded
in cutting the Komiatum track in several places.
In preparation for the new
offensive, Savige was instructed that his force should be so organised
that by 28 August it could be maintained from the sea without air
supply. From 21 August the 29th Brigade began to relieve the 17th
Brigade (excluding the 2/7th Battalion attached to the 15th Brigade)
which had been fighting its way through the jungle-clad tangle of
mountains from Wau towards Salamaua since January. The Australians
rapidly advanced towards Salamaua but Savige ordered that the Japanese
were not to be pressed so hard that would cause an early evacuation of
Salamaua.
Salamaua Falls
On 26 August, Savige and his 3rd
Division headquarters were relived by General Milford and his 5th
Division headquarters. The 5th Division conducted the final operations
around Salamaua which was occupied by the 42nd Battalion on 11
September, a week after the Lae offensive opened and five days before
the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions entered Lae.
The 3rd Division's long winter
campaign of 1943 achieved impressive strategic gains. A great part of
the strength of the XVIII Japanese Army had been diverted from the
areas which were to be the objectives of the offensive which could not
be mounted until the spring, when veteran divisions would be rested
and retrained, landing craft available, and air superiority increased.
At the same time immensely valuable experience had been gained in
jungle tactics and in methods of supply. For the first time Australian
infantry and independent companies had worked closely together in a
lengthy campaign and each had learnt from the other.
Artillery had been used on a scale
hitherto unattained in mountain warfare in New Guinea. Doctrines were
developed which gave the Australians decisive tactical and
administrative superiority over the Japanese in bush warfare. In the
six months to August 1943 the strength of the XVIII Japanese Army had
been depleted and dispersed while, behind the front on which the 3rd
Australian Division fought, the Allied strength in the South West
Pacific had greatly increased.
|
