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The Brisbane Line
Controversy
Paul Burns
Allen and Unwin, 1998,
paperback, 254pp
Reviewed by Malcolm Kennedy
An Australian Minister for Defence
once related to this reviewer that when he escorted foreign military
personnel to Australia he took pains to show them how long it took to
fly from our northern coast to the cities on our eastern coast. An enemy
who landed in the north or west he noted would be exhausted and his
vehicles worn out before they could attack the south-eastern boomerang
in which our most productive primary, secondary and tertiary industries
were located. The zone in which most Australians live.
My rejoinder that only a fool would
invade Australia and attempt to cross the interior was not welcome, nor
were my comments that any attempt to defeat Australia would fail unless
it concentrated on the isolation and capture of the productive
boomerang.
Paul Bums' book on the Brisbane Line
provides a fascinating account of similar strategic naivety running back
through the Second to the First World Wars on how Australia might be
best defended. Included are two recent themes made popular by Paul Dibb
which have a long historical lineage. The tailoring of strategic
assessments to budget requirements was first developed during World War
One when military advisers claimed that any enemy would only make raids
on Australia and that there would be adequate surge time to create the
forces needed to defeat them.
The Japanese used the bombing of
Darwin and other northern towns as a means of drawing off large military
resources which could not be committed to the campaign in Papua and New
Guinea. A Japanese invasion of Australia would not have been through a
Perth or Darwin axis. These points could be essentially neutralized by
minor attacks.
The focus of invasion would have been
the south-eastern boomerang. We can ask the counterfactual question what
would have happened if Japan had won the battles for Papua and the
Solomon islands? In the event of a delayed response from the United
States the Japanese would almost certainly have attempted to invade
Australia. This would have been only possible if they were able to
withdraw troops from China and find sufficient shipping to land the
troops on the east coast. A successful lodgment would have extended
their supply lines further and only in the event of a rapid rout of
Australian forces could the invasion have been sustained.
Even in the event of Australia being
denied the United States as a fixed aircraft carrier the island hopping
and naval strategy could have been begun from New Zealand and the
American Pacific territories. Japan's defeat might have been delayed but
it would still have occurred. If the Australian Government had refused
to surrender and escaped to New Zealand the struggle would have been
continued but most Australians would have learnt at first hand the
brutality of Japanese occupation.
There are many ifs and buts in
any possible counterfactual history of the Pacific war; however one
thing that faced both Menzies and Curtin was that the neglect of
Australia's defence during the interwar years had left the nation
ill-prepared to defeat the Japanese in Papua and New Guinea, let alone
an invasion of Australia. Paul Burns has shown that, apart from the
economic imperatives of the period, both sides of politics in Australia
were responsible for our poor defences.
An important irony that he misses is
the fact that Menzies' dispatch of troops to the Middle East later gave
Curtin highly trained and seasoned troops for the defence of Australia
and that greater pre-war production of aircraft would have produced
larger numbers which were inferior to those of the Japanese. The dynamic
of war accelerates weapon development.
Burns' study of the military and
political dimensions of the 'Brisbane Line' controversy is thorough and
may be the definitive study. The level of academic documentation is,
perhaps, more than necessary in a book but the author correctly seeks to
provide conclusive evidence. The story that emerges is one of political
'cowardice, betrayal and deceit' and actions that could have endangered
Australia's security.
Burns has vindicated war-time military
leadership by showing that there was never a 'Brisbane Line' in the form
proclaimed by Ward and others. The recognition that space would have to
be given up for time and preparation was an obvious factor in planning
not to try to defend every point in northern Australia. Given the
equipment and troops available the defence of the whole of Australia's
coastline would have been both impossible and futile.
Blamey was always committed to the
defence of Australia but this was moderated by the necessary strategy
that assets of prime importance must receive the greatest defence and
that until an attack was made remote areas did not warrant the
deployment of forces. In the event of Japan breaking through to attack
Australia it was possible to assume, with a high level of certainty,
that the Japanese would not stage their attack over long distances but
would seek to bring the battle to the most important parts of Australia.
The idea that parts of remote northern
Australia would not be defended was a sensible view; however, this did
not reckon with the use that might be made of such an idea by
politicians prepared to do anything to gain power and prestige. Burns
shows in detail that Menzies never had a 'Brisbane Line' plan and had
never been given such a plan by his military advisers.
This did not stop the Labor party and
the extreme left from using this as a charge that Menzies was a
pro-fascist and had not bothered to develop Australia's defence.
The use by Curtin and the Labor party
of the 'Brisbane Line' myth as an electoral weapon was an act of
overweening deceit, while the wartime use of the myth by Ward, when
Australia was still under threat, was an act that bordered upon
treason.
Burns' extended causal explanation for the durability of the myth is too
inclusive. The public's general strategic ignorance, military weakness
and the loss of confidence in Britain provide an adequate explanation of
why exploitation of the 'Brisbane Line' myth was so profound.
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/books_articles/reviews/brisbaneline-rev.htm
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